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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
The New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding 
House Owners (the "Coalition"), which represents owners of 
rooming and boarding houses ("R&B houses") in the 
Neptune, New Jersey area, together with a number of 
individuals who are residents of those R&B houses, sued in 
the district court to have the Rooming and Boarding House 
Municipal Licensing Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-9 et seq. 
(the "Licensing Law" or the "Act"), and Neptune Ordinances 
Nos. 1658 and 1661 (the "Ordinances"), declared invalid 
under the United States and New Jersey constitutions, the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 10:5-1 et seq. ("NJLAD"), and the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. S 3601 et seq. 
("FHAA"). Defendants are the Township of Neptune and the 
State of New Jersey.1 
 
The FHAA declares that it is unlawful "to discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Originally, the City of Asbury Park and the Borough of Keansburg 
were also named as defendants. Before trial, these defendants settled 
with plaintiffs. 
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sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services 
or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a 
handicap of -- (A) that person; . . . or (C) any person 
associated with that person." 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(2).2 The 
FHAA further provides that discrimination includes "a 
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, 
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations 
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity 
to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B). It 
also stipulates that "any law of a State, a political 
subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to 
require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory 
housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent 
be invalid." 42 U.S.C. S 3615. 
 
Plaintiffs challenged a number of provisions in the Act 
and Ordinances. The district court granted relief on several 
of the plaintiffs' claims and invalidated portions of the Act 
and Ordinances, specifically provisions that imposed 
onerous inspection, licensing, bonding, and zoning 
requirements. Defendants have not appealed from those 
aspects of the district court's order. The court denied relief 
on the plaintiffs' other claims because it determined that 
they lacked standing in view of certain grandfathering 
provisions in the Act. Plaintiffs seek here to overturn the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Plaintiffs assert, and the district court apparently found, that a 
significant percentage of the residents of the R&B houses and a number 
of the individual plaintiffs are handicapped individuals, many of whom 
have been deinstitutionalized from state mental hospitals. New Jersey 
contends that the FHAA does not apply because only a very small 
percentage of handicapped persons live in R&B houses. It supports this 
contention with statistics from certain government reports. New Jersey's 
assertion is controverted, however. In Finding of Fact ("FOF") 14, the 
district court found that a disproportionately high number of people in 
R&B houses have disabilities. See New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and 
Boarding House Owners v. Mayor and Council of the City of Asbury Park, 
Civ. No. 94-5134, at *5 (D.N.J. Jul. 8, 1997). Similarly in FOF 15, the 
district court cited legislative findings that R&B houses are occupied 
primarily by the elderly, disabled and poor. See id. And in FOF 16, the 
district court quoted several R&B owners who testified that most of their 
residents were disabled or otherwise unable to care for themselves. See 
id. The district court's finding that the FHAA applies here is thus 
supported in the record. 
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district court's standing determination so that the court 
may reach the merits of the remaining provisions, 
especially the "distance and density" provisions, which limit 
the number of new R&B houses that can be licensed in a 
municipality and cap the total number of R&B house 
residents to one-half of one percent of the total population 
of each municipality in New Jersey. For reasons that will 
appear, we conclude that the district court made 
insufficient factual findings for us to review its standing 
determination. Because there are several plausible theories 
upon which standing may exist, we will vacate and remand 
for further factual development and a new determination by 
the district court regarding plaintiffs' standing. 
 
To fully review this case, we must also address a number 
of dispositive rulings on various aspects of plaintiffs' claims 
that would be controlling on remand. In particular, we 
examine the district court's decisions not to award plaintiffs 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, or counsel fees, 
and we highlight several statutory and constitutional claims 
that may require further consideration by the district court. 
In the end, we will reverse the district court's determination 
that it need not award compensatory damages once actual 
damages have been shown; we will affirm on the punitive 
damages issue because the district court's factualfinding 
that Neptune did not act outrageously or with reckless 
disregard for plaintiffs' federal rights is not clearly 
erroneous; and we will vacate and remand on the counsel 
fees issue for de novo consideration because of confusion 
surrounding certain procedural issues. 
 
I. 
 
The Act and Ordinances complained of here are the 
progeny of the Rooming and Boarding House Act of 1979, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 55:13B-1 et seq. ("RBHA") adopted by the 
New Jersey Legislature "to provide for the health, safety and 
welfare of all of those who reside in rooming and boarding 
houses in the State. . . ." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 55:13B-2. 
Specifically, the legislature found that because R&B house 
residents were predominately elderly, disabled, and poor, 
they required protection from building and safety hazards, 
as well as from unscrupulous and predatory neighbors and 
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owners. See id. To accomplish this, the RBHA requires any 
person who owns or operates an R&B house first to obtain 
a license from the Commissioner of the Department of 
Community Affairs (the "DCA"). See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 55:13B-7(a). It also provides standards to ensure that 
every R&B house is constructed in a manner that will 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of its residents while 
at the same time promoting a homelike atmosphere 
appropriate to such facilities. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 55:13B- 
6. Those standards include, for example: safety fromfire; 
safety from structural, mechanical, plumbing and electrical 
deficiencies; adequate light and ventilation; physical 
security; protection from harassment, fraud, and eviction 
without due cause; clean and reasonably comfortable 
surroundings; the adequate rendering of personal and 
financial services in boarding houses; disclosure of owner 
identification information; and maintenance of orderly and 
sufficient financial and occupancy records. See id. To 
ensure compliance with these standards, the regulatory 
scheme provides for annual inspections by the State of all 
licensed R&B houses. See N.J. Stat. Ann.S 55:13B-9. 
 
In December 1993, New Jersey enacted the Licensing 
Law, which gave the governing body of each municipality in 
New Jersey the option of assuming from the State the 
licensing responsibility for R&B houses. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 40:52-10. Upon exercising that option, a municipality 
becomes responsible for ensuring compliance with State 
and local laws and therefore for protecting the health, 
safety, and welfare of the residents of those facilities. The 
Act requires that municipality to create an authority, in 
accordance with N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-18, to assume the 
State's former duty of investigating applicants and their 
proposed R&B houses to determine, among other things, 
whether the facilities in question "are in compliance with all 
applicable building, housing, health and safety code 
regulations." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-13(a). Also, the 
licensing authority verifies that the applicant has never 
been convicted "of a crime involving moral turpitude, or any 
crime under any law of the State licensing or regulating a 
rooming and boarding house" and has never had its license 
revoked under the RBHA. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-13(b). 
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In early 1994, the Neptune Town Council, acting under 
the authority vested in it by the Licensing Law, adopted two 
Ordinances, Nos. 1658 and 1661, and assumed local 
control over R&B licensing in Neptune. Ordinance No. 1661 
established a "Site Licensing Board" consisting of three 
persons and adopted virtually all of the essential elements 
of the Licensing Law. Ordinance No. 1658 required, among 
other things, that each R&B house owner secure a 
Certificate of Inspection prior to leasing, renting, or 
otherwise allowing the occupancy of any unit, room, or 
rental dwelling space within its facility. 
 
II. 
 
The district court found that a number of provisions of 
the Act and Ordinances violated the FHAA. The invalidated 
provisions had required: (1) R&B house owners to get 
Certificates of Inspection each time a new tenant occupied 
a room in their house; (2) public hearings before the Site 
Licensing Board would issue operating licenses to R&B 
house owners; (3) R&B house owners to secure bonding to 
cover relocation costs in the event that their R&B house 
was forced to close; and (4) applicants for site licensing to 
obtain zoning approvals for premises that had already been 
shown to have been properly zoned. See New Jersey 
Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House Owners v. Mayor 
and Council of the City of Asbury Park, Civ. No. 94-5134, at 
*34 (D.N.J. Jul. 8, 1997) ("District Court Opinion"). The 
district court found that these provisions were freighted 
with discriminatory intent, were unduly burdensome to 
plaintiffs, and that the Township had failed to make 
reasonable accommodations to allow handicapped persons 
to live in the residences and communities of their choice. 
See id. at 26-29. As we have observed, defendants have not 
appealed those aspects of the district court's order that 
invalidated portions of the Act and Ordinances. 
 
With respect to the balance of their claims, however, the 
district court ruled against plaintiffs. Most notably, on the 
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, the court did not 
reach their claims challenging the distance and density 
provisions of the Act. The district court also made several 
other rulings that are perforce before us now. The court 
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found that it had discretion to award compensatory 
damages but decided that this was an inappropriate case in 
which to exercise that discretion because the R&B owners 
(the only plaintiffs for whom the district court found any 
standing) were not members of the protected group of 
handicapped individuals. The district court also rejected 
plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages in view of its 
determination that defendants did not act with the requisite 
outrageousness and reckless disregard of plaintiffs' federal 
rights. Finally, the court failed to mention (and thus 
effectively denied) plaintiffs' request for counsel fees and 
costs as a prevailing party under the FHAA. 
 
III. 
 
As noted above, the district court refused to consider 
plaintiffs' challenges to the distance and density provisions 
of the Licensing Law on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to assert them. The distance provision states that 
no license shall be issued for any R&B house when any 
part of the boundary line of any other R&B house is within 
1,000 feet (in the case of a municipality with a population 
greater than 100,000, the standard may be increased to 
2,000 feet). See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-14(c). The density 
section provides that no license shall be issued that would 
result in increasing the total number of persons authorized 
to be residents in R&B houses within the municipality to: 
(1) more than 100 in a municipality having a population of 
20,000 or fewer, or (2) to more than one-half of one percent 
of the population in any other municipality. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 40:52-14(b). Clearly, the evident purpose of both of 
these provisions is to permit municipalities to limit the 
number of R&B residents and/or homes within their 
borders. Plaintiffs assert that this scheme is as patently 
illegal as would be one that limited the number and/or 
housing options of members of an ethnic group within a 
particular municipality. 
 
The ground upon which the district court found that 
plaintiffs lacked standing was that the Act and the 
Ordinances contained a "grandfather" clause that exempted 
all existing R&B homes from application of the distance and 
density provisions. See N.J. Stat. Ann.S 40:52-14(b) & (c) 
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("but nothing in this subsection shall warrant refusal of a 
license or license renewal for premises where a rooming or 
boarding house has been in lawful operation prior to the 
enactment of this act"). The court reasoned that there was, 
therefore, no way in which plaintiffs, all of whom are 
owners or residents of existing R&B homes in Neptune, 
could be harmed by these provisions. There are, however, a 
number of other possible bases under which plaintiffs could 
establish standing to challenge the distance and density 
provisions, but these have either been inadequatelyfleshed 
out in the record or lack sufficient factual findings by the 
district court to facilitate our review. While there is an 
extensive section of the district court's opinion labeled 
"Findings of Fact," in reality, the numbered "findings" are, 
for the most part, no more than recitations of various 
witnesses' testimony. 
 
First, plaintiffs maintain that there has been a decline in 
the R&B housing stock in Neptune due to the distance and 
density provisions of the Act, and that it will therefore be 
difficult for disabled individuals to find lodging in the 
future. There is evidence in the record to this effect. For 
example, Ms. Andress testified that the Ordinances reduced 
the number of R&B houses in the community. See District 
Court Opinion, at *12. In addition, other evidence indicates 
that current R&B owners, despite the grandfather clauses, 
may have been detrimentally affected by the distance and 
density provisions. Notably, Mr. Mumford testified that his 
business volume and the financial rewards he could obtain 
decreased because of the Act, see id. at 11, and Ms. 
Andress opined that, although her R&B house was fully 
rented, the Act and Ordinances hurt her because the value 
of her property declined and consequently she could no 
longer sell her property and retire as planned. See id. at 13. 
Similarly, the Act and Ordinances preclude current owners 
from expanding their facilities into adjacent lots because 
only existing R&B houses are grandfathered. Finally, 
plaintiffs adduced evidence that they are harmed not only 
by the Act and Ordinances themselves, but also by the 
hostile manner in which defendants administered them. 
See id. at 12-13. 
 
Although further factual development is necessary, the 
evidence and theories just described might be sufficient to 
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establish standing by the R&B owners and/or the resident 
plaintiffs to challenge the distance and density provisions of 
the Act. However, because these possible bases for standing 
may well be factually challenged and, at all events, have 
been inadequately fleshed out in the record and lack 
sufficient findings to facilitate our review, we will vacate the 
judgment of the district court and remand for further 
proceedings at which the plaintiffs will have the opportunity 
to attempt to establish standing in the first instance. If they 
succeed, the district court will then reach the merits. 
 
IV. 
 
A. Compensatory Damages 
 
Although it granted relief on certain claims, the district 
court declined to award compensatory damages, which are 
said by plaintiffs to flow from emotional harm resulting 
from: (1) the distress to owners and residents caused by not 
knowing whether they would be forced to close or move, 
and (2) the distress to the residents caused by not being 
able to live in the housing units which they desired, and/or 
fearing they would have to leave a place that could 
accommodate their needs and in which they felt safe. 
Specifically, plaintiffs point to several findings of fact and 
conclusions by the district court that they claim 
demonstrate the intangible damages that they suffered. 
These include repeated public meetings in Neptune 
Township denouncing R&B houses (FOF 43); meetings 
between Neptune and state officials intended to reduce the 
number of deinstitutionalized in Neptune (FOF 28); the 
appointment of biased members to the Site Licensing Board 
(FOF 31), which caused owners and residents to live in fear 
of having their R&B houses closed by a "corrupted" local 
licensing system (FOF 35); and the adoption of onerous and 
unnecessary provisions designed to discourage R&B house 
owners from remaining in the community, such as 
mandating the fingerprinting of R&B house owners and 
requiring R&B owners to prove their pre-existing, non- 
conforming zoning status to retain their licenses (FOF 45, 
38-40; Conclusion of Law 40). See District Court Opinion, 
at 8-12, 26. 
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Apparently, the district court believed that the FHAA 
conferred upon it the discretion to decide whether to award 
compensatory damages. See District Court Opinion, at *31 
("The plaintiff owners claim that they were harmed due to 
the distress caused by not knowing whether they would be 
forced to close. I find that such damages are not 
appropriate in this case. . . . Damages for emotional 
distress in discrimination cases are generally granted to the 
members of the protected group . . . . This rationale simply 
does not apply in this case . . . ."). This conclusion is 
understandable given the wording of the compensatory 
damage provision in the FHAA: "In a civil action under 
subsection (a) of this section, if the court finds that a 
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to 
occur, the court may award to the plaintiff actual and 
punitive damages," 42 U.S.C. S 3613(c)(1) (emphasis added), 
and the surprisingly sparse case law in this area. 
 
While at first glance this language ("may award") appears 
discretionary, we decline to accept the district court's 
reading, and instead endorse the Ninth Circuit's thoughtful 
opinion in United States v. Hayward, which concluded that 
the compensatory damages provisions of the FHAA are  
mandatory.3 See United States v. Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 
839-40 (9th Cir. 1994). In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974), which found no 
discretion with respect to actual damages under a 
predecessor damages provision of the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 42 U.S.C. S 3610 et seq. ("FHA"), and the legislative 
history of the FHAA, which parroted the language of the old 
damage provision when it amended the FHA without 
making any substantial changes or mentioning the Curtis 
decision. In deciding that a party could demand a jury trial 
in a civil action under the FHA, a unanimous Supreme 
Court in Curtis had analyzed the formerS 3612, the 
predecessor damage provision to the one at issue here, and 
found that "if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our discussion with respect to counsel fees, see infra S IV.C, is 
another example where statutory language that appears discretionary on 
its face has been construed in a such way as to restrict trial courts' 
judgment. 
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actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that 
amount." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. The court based this 
conclusion upon its characterization of the claim as a legal 
claim for damages, rather than an equitable claim for 
restitution. See id. 
 
As the Ninth Circuit points out, when Congress amended 
the FHA in 1988 and replaced the damage provision at 
issue in Curtis with S 3613, it did not substantially change 
any language therein, nor did it indicate any displeasure 
with the Curtis decision. The former S 3612(c) provided: 
"The court . . . may award to the plaintiff actual damages 
and not more that $1,000 punitive damages . . . ." The new 
S 3613(c) provides: "[T]he court may award to the plaintiff 
actual and punitive damages . . . ." The wording in the 
amended damage provision is virtually identical to old 
language except that Congress eliminated the $1,000 cap 
on punitive damages. The legislative history of the new 
enforcement provisions in the FHAA confirms this reading: 
 
       Section [3613(c)] provides for the types of relief a court 
       may grant. This section is intended to continue the 
       types of relief that are provided under current law, but 
       removes the $1,000 limitation on the award of punitive 
       damages. The Committee believes that the limit on 
       punitive damages served as a major impediment to 
       imposing an effective deterrent on violators and a 
       disincentive for private persons to bring suits under 
       existing law. 
 
H.R.Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 39-40 (1988), 
reprinted in, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2200-01 (footnotes 
omitted). On the basis of this language and the unanimous 
mandate of the Supreme Court, we agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that "Congress did not intend the courts to have 
discretion to award actual compensatory damages if a party 
has actual damages," for if it did, "it would have changed 
the language of the new damages provisions when it 
enacted the 1988 Amendments." Hayward, 36 F.3d at 839. 
Thus, "if a party proves actual damages, a district court's 
award of compensatory damages is mandatory, not 
discretionary." Id. 
 
Defendants advance several alternative arguments in the 
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event that we were to conclude, as we have, that the award 
of damages under S 3613(c)(1) is mandatory. First, they 
contend, and the district court held, that damages for 
emotional distress should only be available to the 
deinstitutionalized, and not to the R&B owners, because 
the owners are not members of a protected group under the 
FHAA. We find nothing in the statute, however, that 
distinguishes between handicapped plaintiffs and those 
who are not. The statute directs that the court "may award 
to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages."4 42 U.S.C. 
S 3613(c)(1) (emphasis supplied). Given thatS 3613(c)(1) 
requires the district court to award damages if they are 
proven, we see no basis in the language or history of the 
statute to carve out groups of legitimate plaintiffs to which 
S 3613(c)(1) does not apply (and defendants have not 
identified any precedent to the contrary). 
 
We find support for this conclusion in United States v. 
Scott, 809 F. Supp. 1404, 1406-07 (D. Kan. 1992), where 
the court permitted the seller of a home intended to be 
used as a group home for physically and mentally 
handicapped adults to sue as an "aggrieved person" under 
the FHAA and to recover actual compensatory damages for 
emotional distress based upon specific instances of "cool 
treatment and social shunning" by the defendants. 
Therefore, should plaintiffs ultimately prevail on remand 
over defendants' alternative positions discussed next (as 
well as on the distance and density provisions if they can 
establish standing), the district court will be required to 
calculate damages. 
 
Defendants also make several fact-based arguments why 
compensatory damages are not warranted here. For 
example, defendants claim that there is not enough 
evidence of emotional distress related to actions taken by 
Neptune officials (as opposed to the Ocean Grove 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(2) declares that it is unlawful "to discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental 
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 
with such dwelling, because of a handicap of -- (A) that person; . . . or 
(C) any person associated with that person." Thus, under the FHAA, 
plaintiffs can be both handicapped and non-handicapped individuals. 
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Homeowners Association) to justify compensation. 
Defendants also urge that, because plaintiffs ultimately 
received their licenses and zoning approvals, they could not 
possibly have suffered emotional distress due to defendants' 
discriminatory practices which only threatened their 
livelihoods. Finally, defendants contend that, because the 
Department of Community Affairs could have closed down 
the R&B houses for legitimate violations prior to the 
passage of the Act and Ordinances, any argument by 
plaintiffs that they suffered emotional distress based upon 
the threat of closure by the Site Licensing Board after 
passage of the Act and Ordinances is unavailing. These 
arguments may in fact prevail, and plaintiffs' damage 
claims may prove ephemeral. However, given the district 
court's erroneous conclusion that it had discretion under 
S 3613(c)(1) to decide whether to award damages, these 
arguments should be considered by the district court on 
remand. 
 
B. Punitive Damages 
 
The district court also declined to award punitive 
damages. In so doing, the court concluded that defendants 
were not motivated by "evil motive or intent" and did not 
act with the requisite outrageousness and reckless 
disregard of plaintiffs' federal rights to justify an award of 
punitive damages. See District Court Opinion, at *32. As 
factual findings, we review these conclusions to determine 
if they are clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Under this narrow review, 
we cannot disturb the district court's determination. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that punitive damages can ever 
be awarded against a municipal defendant. See Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 n.29 (1981) ("It is 
perhaps possible to imagine an extreme situation where 
taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an 
outrageous abuse of constitutional rights."). We agree with 
the district court that, if they can be, they are not 
warranted here. That is because plaintiffs have not adduced 
evidence of the "widespread and knowledgeable 
participation by the taxpayers" sufficient to meet the 
Supreme Court's Newport exception. See Heritage Homes of 
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Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
 
C. Counsel Fees 
 
The district court failed to address plaintiffs' motion for 
counsel fees and costs to which, as the prevailing party, 
they were entitled under 42 U.S.C. S 3613(c)(2).5 As with 
S 3613(c)(1), this provision, which sounds fully 
discretionary -- "the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs" -- actually is not. 42 U.S.C. 
S 3613(c)(2) (emphasis supplied). In fact, a district court's 
discretion not to grant attorney's fees and costs in civil 
rights cases is tightly cabined. See Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) ("It follows that one 
who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title 
should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special 
circumstances would render such an award unjust."); see 
also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n.1 (1989); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 3602(o) provides that " `Prevailing Party' has the same meaning 
as such term has in section 1988 of this title." Defendants contend that 
plaintiffs were not a "prevailing party" for the purposes of the FHAA. 
They argue that, although plaintiffs have won, they have obtained only 
de minimis relief in comparison with what they sought. For example, 
defendants argue that while plaintiffs have gotten certain parts of the 
Act 
and Ordinances enjoined, they sought a permanent injunction barring 
enforcement of the Act and Ordinances in their entirety. Thus, with 
respect to "their real goal," defendants contend that plaintiffs suffered 
"total defeat." We find no merit to this argument. Plaintiffs have easily 
satisfied the "prevailing party" standards set forth in Metropolitan 
Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 
1992). Namely, plaintiffs " `achieved some of the benefit sought by the 
party bringing the suit' " and the " `litigation constituted a material 
contributing factor in bringing about the events that resulted in 
obtaining the desired relief.' " Id. (quoting Dunn v. United States, 842 
F.2d 1420, 1433 (3d Cir. 1988)). Indeed, the relief realized by plaintiffs 
to this point is far from de minimis, and upon remand, they may be 
successful in invalidating even more of the Act and Ordinances. Of 
course, the district court will have to determine, consistent with Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983), whether plaintiffs' counsel fee 
request should be reduced because plaintiffs only achieved partial 
success. 
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Hatfield v. Hayes, 877 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1989); 
DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d. 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1980); David 
v. Travisono, 621 F.2d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 1980); Robinson v. 
Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1980); Bonnes v. 
Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979).6 The district 
court did not find any "special circumstances" justifying its 
decision not to award attorney's fees and costs (in fact, it 
offered no explanation whatever), and we find none. 
 
That being said, we cannot direct an award of counsel 
fees because the procedural history surrounding this aspect 
of the case is murky. Plaintiffs included a request for 
counsel fees and costs in the prayer for relief of their 
complaint. On July 8, 1997, the district court entered a 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs on several issues, against 
them on others, that simply did not mention plaintiffs' 
request for attorneys fees and taxed costs. On July 22, 
1997, plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal appealing 
from "the final judgment entered in this action on the 8th 
day of July, 1997." App. at iii. On July 29, 1997, twenty- 
one days after the judgment was entered, plaintiffs filed a 
timely "Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Piggie Park, the Supreme Court was interpreting the fee-shifting 
language contained in S 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000a-3(b). In the other cases cited above, the courts were interpreting 
similar language found in 42 U.S.C. S 1988. The language in both 
S 204(b) and S 1988 is almost identical to the language at issue here, and 
under Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 
758-59 & n.2 (1989) (citation omitted), we are directed that "fee-shifting 
statutes' similar language is `a strong indication' that they are to be 
interpreted alike." See also Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 
884 
F.2d 713, 719 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the same standards for sua 
sponte reductions in attorneys' fees requests in ERISA cases as apply in 
civil rights cases); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. 
Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying same 
standards for setting "reasonable" attorney's fees under the Clean Air Act 
as apply under S 1988), modified on other grounds, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), 
rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711 (1987). Therefore, we believe that 
the standard enunciated in Piggie Park and Blanchard regarding the 
extent of the district court's discretion to award a prevailing party 
counsel fees is the proper one to apply to cases brought under the 
FHAA. 
 
                                16 
  
Pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ.] Rule 60, and Motion to Tax 
Costs, Including Attorney Fees, Pursuant to [N.J. Civ.] 
Local Rule 54.1." In paragraphs 10 through 12 of his 
certification accompanying these motions, plaintiffs' 
counsel stated (underscoring in original): 
 
       I called the Clerk to discuss the taxing of costs under 
       these circumstances. I inquired as to the manner of 
       filing the motion to reform the judgment and obtain 
       attorney fees in light of the 3 day return in [N.J. Civ.] 
       Rule 54.1. Obviously the Clerk would not be entitled to 
       reform a judgment or to assess attorney fees. 
 
       I was instructed to submit a Bill of Taxed Costs on the 
       presumption that if the judgment was silent, it was 
       intended that costs should be awarded to the 
       prevailing party, and make the motion for the 
       remainder of the relief to the Court. 
 
       I have proceeded in this fashion, therefore, filing this 
       motion pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ.] Rule 60  and Rule 
       54.1 of the local rules, for costs, including attorney 
       fees, which I believe to be appropriate pursuant to 42 
       U.S.C. S 3613(c)(2), to be read in conjunction with 42 
       U.S.C. S 1988. 
 
The district court denied these motions on October 6, 1997. 
 
It appears to us that plaintiffs filed a viable (and timely) 
petition for counsel fees pursuant to N.J. Civ. R. 54.1 
within 30 days of the judgment.7 However, when the matter 
came before Judge Brown, to whom the case was assigned 
following the death of Judge Fisher, the only issue that was 
apparently presented to him was the question whether 
Judge Fisher had intentionally or inadvertently left counsel 
fees and costs out of the judgment. Judge Brown concluded 
that the omission was deliberate, and he consequently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It is not clear to us whether plaintiffs should have moved for counsel 
fees under Local Rule 54.1, "Costs", or Local Rule 54.2, "Compensation 
for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses," and the issue 
has not been briefed. At all events, it was clear from the face of the 
motion what plaintiffs were seeking, so to the extent that they may have 
mislabelled their motion, any mistake is of no moment. 
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denied plaintiffs relief under Rule 60. In his judgment, 
delivered from the bench, Judge Brown concluded: 
 
       It seems to me that a Rule 60 motion clearly does not 
       lie here. There is no evidence whatsoever of any clerical 
       mistake, rather the order and the findings and 
       conclusions are clear, except to the very limited extent 
       set forth therein; the plaintiff's request for relief was 
       denied and judgment was entered for the defense. 
 
From these statements, it appears that Judge Brown only 
considered the Rule 60 motion, and not the Local Rule 54.1 
motion, which was timely filed and properly before the 
court. Moreover, it is possible that plaintiffs will prevail on 
additional claims in light of our discussion with regard to 
their standing to challenge the distance and density 
provisions, and hence the district court may have to 
consider counsel fees and costs on those issues in the 
future. 
 
Given the foregoing circumstances, we think that the best 
approach is to send back this entire matter for 
reconsideration of the Local Rule 54.1 motion. This 
disposition will not prejudice defendants because plaintiffs' 
fee request was included in their complaint and was 
preserved in their Notice of Appeal filed on July 22, 1997. 
 
D. Statutory and Constitutional Claims 
 
Assuming plaintiffs can establish standing upon remand, 
the district court will have to consider several troubling 
aspects of the Act and Ordinances, most notably the 
distance and density provisions contained in N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 40:52-14. If standing is established, the district 
court will have to determine whether these provisions 
violate the FHAA, the United States and New Jersey 
constitutions, and the NJLAD.8 Of course, the court will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. While plaintiffs contend that the Licensing Act and Ordinances were 
the result of a malicious, five year effort by defendants to reduce the 
number of mentally handicapped in Neptune to an "acceptable" number 
and therefore served no cognizable interest under the FHAA or the 
United States and New Jersey constitutions, we are satisfied that the 
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take up the statutory claims first and may not have to 
reach the constitutional issues. As noted above, plaintiffs 
contend that the distance and density provisions were 
motivated by discriminatory animus and are unduly 
burdensome on the deinstitutionalized who wish to live in 
the residences and communities of their choice. They 
further submit that the Township has not attempted to 
reasonably accommodate them as required under the FHAA 
and has offered no rational basis or legitimate government 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
state and local defendants have established a valid justification for the 
overall regulatory scheme -- namely, to promote the health and safety of 
R&B residents, many of whom require state protection. We therefore 
reject plaintiffs' argument that the Act and Ordinances must be rejected 
in toto because they were the product of discriminatory intent. 
 
Moreover, since the FHAA provides for the severability of statutes, see 
42 U.S.C. S 3615 ("[A]ny law of a State. . . that purports to require or 
permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under 
this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid.") (emphasis supplied), 
the 
district court properly examined each provision of the Act and 
Ordinances separately when determining whether there were any 
statutory violations. Likewise, a review of New Jersey law indicates that 
ordinances and statutes should be preserved against constitutional or 
other attack to the greatest extent possible. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 1:1-10 
("If any title, subtitle, chapter, article or section of the Revised 
Statutes, 
or any provision thereof, shall be declared to be unconstitutional, 
invalid 
or inoperative, in whole or in part, by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
such title, subtitle, chapter, article, section or provision shall, to the 
extent that it is not unconstitutional, invalid or inoperative, be 
enforced 
and effectuated, and no such determination shall be deemed to 
invalidate or make ineffectual the remaining titles, subtitles, chapters, 
articles, sections or provisions"); Barone v. Department of Human 
Services, 526 A.2d 1055, 1063 (N.J. 1987) (power to declare statutes 
void must "be delicately exercised"); see also New Jersey v. Patton, 607 
A.2d 191, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (if necessary, a court 
" `may engage in a judicial surgery to excise a constitutional defect or 
engraft a needed meaning.' ") (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 
627 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 1993); Gilman v. Newark, 180 A.2d 365, 386-87 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1962) (when provisions of an ordinance are 
severable, the invalidity of the severable parts does not render the 
entire 
ordinance invalid). Therefore, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the Act 
and Ordinances do not rise or fall together -- the district court properly 
analyzed each section separately. 
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interest served by "declustering" the deinstitutionalized. 
Although the merits are not properly before us, we note 
that provisions similar to these have already been struck 
down under the FHAA based upon many of the same 
factual findings that the district court in this case has 
already made with respect to the portions of the Act and 
Ordinances on which it found that plaintiffs had standing. 
See e.g., ARC of New Jersey, Inc. v. New Jersey, 950 F. 
Supp. 637 (D.N.J. 1996); Association for Advancement of 
the Mentally Handicapped, Inc. v. Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 
614 (D.N.J. 1994); Horizon House Developmental Serv's, Inc. 
v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 693- 
95 (E.D. Pa. 1992).9 
 
Insofar as the plaintiffs continue to challenge the 
remainder of the provisions of the Act and Ordinances, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Horizon House, the court determined that a township ordinance 
that imposed a distance requirement of 1,000 feet between group homes 
for mentally retarded people was facially invalid under the FHAA 
regardless of the motive of the drafters, and even if it incidentally 
affected some unrelated groups of non-disabled individuals such as 
juveniles and ex-criminal offenders. See Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 
694. The court rejected the Township's rationale that "declustering" 
promoted integration into the community and was thus benign. See id. 
at 695. In addition, the Horizon House court found discriminatory intent 
on the part of the Township based upon animus similar to that found by 
the district court in this case. See id. at 696 (determining that the 
ordinance was passed in "response to community opposition and to 
outmoded fears about people with mental retardation"). 
 
The Horizon House court also concluded that the challenged ordinance 
had a discriminatory effect which would have been grounds for 
invalidation even if it were not facially invalid or the product of 
discriminatory intent. See id. at 697. The discriminatory effects found by 
the court were that the spacing requirement limited the number of 
people with disabilities who could live within the Township, limited their 
choices on where to live, limited their access to essential community 
resources, and thwarted efforts to treat people with handicaps equally in 
the community thereby negatively affecting their self-esteem. See id. 
 
Finally, the court in Horizon House determined that the spacing 
requirement failed to provide persons with disabilities with a reasonable 
accommodation because it was a blanket and categorical rule under 
which the process of obtaining variances was lengthy, costly, and 
burdensome. See id. at 700. 
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consider them to be unexceptional, and find that they were 
properly upheld by the district court, including sections 
that: (1) permit municipalities to license R&B houses locally 
in the place of the Department of Community Affairs, see 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-10; (2) require a licensing fee and 
provide for the submission of information and supporting 
documentation so the licensing authority can conduct an 
investigation of the applicant, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52- 
12; (3) provide for the inspection of R&B house premises for 
health and safety violations, and prohibit ownership of R&B 
houses by persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, 
see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-13; (4) provide for the term of 
the licenses, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-15; (5) provide 
when licenses may be revoked, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52- 
16, (6) provide for appeals to the Department of Community 
Affairs and Appellate Division of the New Jersey courts in 
the event of a revocation of a license, see N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 40:52-17; and (7) establish the requirements for 
municipal licensing authorities, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52- 
18. 
 
As the district court concluded, none of these provisions 
is unduly burdensome on plaintiffs, and they do not violate 
the FHAA. Their essential impact is to shift the oversight 
and enforcement of R&B houses from the state to local 
level. Similar provisions for licensing, inspections, 
revocation, et cetera, existed under the state-administered 
regime, and we will not invalidate provisions of a statute 
whose only effect is to authorize local communities to 
assume an enforcement role at their election -- even if 
there was discriminatory animus behind the legislation -- 
without some evidence that the provisions were unduly 
burdensome. In addition, the provisions are rationally 
related to the government's legitimate purpose of protecting 
the mentally ill and aged who live in R&B houses, and thus 
they do not violate either the United States or the New 
Jersey constitutions. 
 
Finally, we note that N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40:52-13(d), which 
requires each owner of a R&B house to establish a 
"sufficient guarantee of financial and other responsibility to 
assure appropriate relocation of the residents of the 
rooming or boarding house to suitable facilities in the event 
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that the license is subsequently revoked or its renewal 
denied," also seems problematic under the FHAA and 
possibly the United States and New Jersey constitutions. As 
with the bonding provision in Neptune Ordinance 1661, 
this was inadequately briefed and explained to both the 
district court and to us; we simply highlight it for scrutiny 
on remand. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. Parties to bear their own costs. 
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